Bava Kamma 65
אחר לית ליה אימתא דרביה האי אית ליה אימתא דרביה
— A stranger need not fear the master-smith<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who should thus have borne in mind that the stranger might not yet have left the place. The smith should therefore not yet have allowed the the sparks to fly off. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
רב זביד משמיה דרבא מתני לה אהא ומצא פרט לממציא את עצמו מכאן א"ר אליעזר בן יעקב מי שיצתה אבן מתחת ידו והוציא הלה את ראשו וקיבלה פטור א"ר יוסי בר חנינא פטור מגלות וחייב בארבעה דברים
whereas the apprentice is in fear of his master.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who should not resonably have expected him to have still been there. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
מאן דמתני לה אהא כ"ש אקמייתא ומאן דמתני לה אקמייתא אבל אהא פטור לגמרי:
R. Zebid in the name of Raba referred [the remark of R Jose b. Hanina] to the following: [The verse,] <i>And [it] lighteth [upon his neighbour]</i>,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XIX, 5; v. supra, p. 175, n. 3. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
ת"ר פועלים שבאו לתבוע שכרן מבעל הבית ונגחן שורו של בעל הבית ונשכן כלבו של בעה"ב ומת פטור אחרים אומרים רשאין פועלין לתבוע שכרן מבעל הבית
excludes [a case] where the neighbour brings himself [within the range of the missile]. Hence the statement made by R. Eliezer b. Jacob: If a man lets [fly] a stone out of his hand and another [at that moment] puts out his head [through a window] and receives the blow [and is killed], he is exempt.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Mak. 8a. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ה"ד אי דשכיח במתא מ"ט דאחרים אי דשכיח בבית מ"ט דת"ק
[Now, it was with reference to this case that] R. Jose b. Hanina said: He is exempt from having to take refuge,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of manslaughter. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
לא צריכא בגברא דשכיח ולא שכיח וקרי אבבא ואמר להו אין מר סבר אין עול תא משמע ומ"ס אין קום אדוכתך משמע
but he would be liable for the four [additional] items.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it was an act of negligence to throw a stone where people are to be found. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
תניא כמ"ד אין קום אדוכתך משמע דתניא פועל שנכנס לתבוע שכרו מבעה"ב ונגחו שורו של בעה"ב או נשכו כלבו פטור אע"פ שנכנס ברשות אמאי פטור אלא לאו דקרי אבבא ואמר ליה אין וש"מ אין קום אדוכתך משמע:
He who refers this remark to this [last] case will with more reason refer it to the cases dealt with previously,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of the joiner, who at least knew that a newcomer had entered his workshop. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שני שוורין תמין שחבלו זה את זה משלמין במותר חצי נזק שניהן מועדין משלמין במותר נזק שלם
whereas he who refers it to those dealt with previously<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of the joiner, who at least knew that a newcomer had entered his workshop. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
אחד תם ואחד מועד מועד בתם משלם במותר נ"ש תם במועד משלם במותר חצי נזק
would maintain that in this [last] case<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Dealt with by R. Eliezer b. Jacob, where the defendant is to blame as he put out his head after the stone had already been in motion. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
אדם במועד ומועד באדם משלם במותר נזק שלם אדם בתם ותם באדם אדם בתם משלם במותר נזק שלם תם באדם משלם במותר חצי נזק ר' עקיבא אומר אף תם שחבל באדם משלם במותר נזק שלם:
Our Rabbis taught: If employees come to [the private residence of] their employer to demand their wages from him and [it so happens that] their employer's ox gores them or their employer's dog bites them, with fatal results, he [the employer] is exempt [from ransom].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For which cf. Ex. XXI, 30. The vicious beast is, however, stoned; v. supra p. 118. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> ת"ר (שמות כא, לא) כמשפט הזה יעשה לו כמשפט שור בשור כך משפט שור באדם מה שור בשור תם משלם חצי נזק ומועד נזק שלם אף שור באדם תם משלם חצי נזק ומועד נזק שלם
Others,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to Hor. 13b, the views of R. Meir were sometimes quoted thus; cf. however Ber. 9b; Sot. 12a; A.Z. 64b. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
ר' עקיבא אומר כמשפט הזה כתחתון ולא כעליון
however, maintain that employees have the right to [come and] demand their wages from their employer. Now, what were the circumstances [of the case]? If the employer could be found in [his] city [offices], what reason [could be adduced] for [the view maintained by] the 'Others'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to Hor. 13b, the views of R. Meir were sometimes quoted thus; cf. however Ber. 9b; Sot. 12a; A.Z. 64b. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
יכול משלם מן העלייה ת"ל יעשה לו מגופו משלם ואינו משלם מן העלייה
If [on the other hand] he could be found only at home, what reason [could be given] for [the anonymous view expressed by] the first Tanna? — No, the application [of the case] is where the employer could [sometimes] be found [in his city offices] but could not [always] be found [there]. The employees therefore called at his [private] door, when the reply was 'Yes'. One view<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., that of 'Others'. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
ורבי עקיבא לפוטרו מארבעה דברים מנא ליה נפקא ליה (ויקרא כד, יט) מאיש כי יתן מום בעמיתו איש בעמיתו ולא שור בעמיתו
maintains that 'Yes' may signify: 'Remain standing in the place where you are.' It has indeed been taught in accordance with the view<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Put forward by the first Tanna. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
ורבנן אי מההיא הוה אמינא צער לחודיה אבל ריפוי ושבת אימא ליתן ליה קמ"ל:
maintaining that 'Yes' may [in this case] signify: 'Remain standing in the place where you are.' For it has been taught: 'If an employee enters the [private] residence of his employer to demand his wages from him and the employer's ox gores him or the employer's dog bites him, he [the employer] is exempt even where the entrance had been made by permission.' Why should there indeed be exemption<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where the entrance had been made by permission. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שור שוה מנה שנגח שור שוה מאתים ואין הנבילה יפה כלום נוטל את השור:
unless in the case where he called at the door and the employer said: 'Yes'? This thus proves that 'Yes' [in such a case] signifies: 'Remain standing in the place where you are.
<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> מתניתין מני רבי עקיבא היא דתניא יושם השור בב"ד דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר הוחלט השור
<b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IN THE CASE OF TWO <i>TAM</i> OXEN INJURING EACH OTHER, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF HALF-DAMAGES.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 73. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
וקמיפלגי בהאי קרא (שמות כא, לה) ומכרו את השור החי וחצו את כספו ר' ישמעאל סבר לבי דינא קמזהר רחמנא ור"ע סבר לניזק ומזיק מזהר להו רחמנא
WHERE ONE WAS <i>TAM</i> AND THE OTHER <i>MU'AD</i> THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY <i>MU'AD</i> TO <i>TAM</i> WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPENSATION, WHEREAS THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY <i>TAM</i> TO <i>MU'AD</i> WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF HALF-DAMAGES. SIMILARLY IN THE CASE OF TWO PERSONS INJURING EACH OTHER, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL. WHERE MAN HAS DAMAGED <i>MU'AD</i> AND <i>MU'AD</i> HAS INJURED MAN, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL. BUT WHERE MAN DAMAGED <i>TAM</i> AND <i>TAM</i> INJURED MAN, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY MAN TO <i>TAM</i> WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPENSATION, WHEREAS THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY <i>TAM</i> TO <i>MU'AD</i> WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF HALF-DAMAGES. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAYS: EVEN IN THE CASE OF <i>TAM</i> INJURING MAN THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf supra p. 15. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
בעא מיניה רבא מר"נ מכרו מזיק לר' ישמעאל מהו כיון דא"ר ישמעאל בעל חוב הוא וזוזי הוא דמסיק ליה מכור או דלמא
[imply that] the judgement in the case of Ox damaging ox applies also in the case of Ox injuring man. Just as where Ox has damaged ox half-damages are paid in the case of <i>Tam</i> and full compensation in the case of <i>Mu'ad</i>, so also where Ox has injured man only half damages will be paid in the case of <i>Tam</i> and full compensation in the case of <i>Mu'ad</i>. R. Akiba, however, says: [The words,] 'According to this judgement' refer to [the ruling that would apply to the circumstances described in] the latter verse<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. XXI, 29 dealing with Mu'ad. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> and not in the former verse.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. XXI, 28 dealing with Tam. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> Could this then mean that the [full] payment is to be made out of the best [of the estate]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in the case of an injury done by Mu'ad. Cf. supra, p. 73. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> [Not so; for] it is stated 'Shall it be done unto it [self],' to emphasise that payment will be made out of the body of <i>Tam</i>, but no payment is to be made out of any other source whatsoever.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 15. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> According to the Rabbis then, what purpose is served by the word 'this'? — To exempt from liability for the four [additional] items.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 133. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> Whence then does R. Akiba derive the exemption [in this case] from liability for the four [additional] items? — He derives it from the text, And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 19. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> [which indicates that there is liability only where] Man injures his neighbour but not where Ox injures the neighbour [of the owner]. And the Rabbis?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Wherefore apply 'this' to deduce exemption from the four items, since that is already derived from this latter verse?] ');"><sup>23</sup></span> — Had the deduction been from that text we might have referred it exclusively to Pain,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The liability for which is not in respect of an actual loss of value. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> but as to Medical Expenses and Loss of Time<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The liability for which is in respect of an actual loss of money sustained. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> we might have held there is still a liability to pay. We are therefore told<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By the expression 'this'. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> [that this is not the case]. <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF AN OX [<i>TAM</i>] OF THE VALUE OF ONE HUNDRED <i>ZUZ</i> HAS GORED AN OX OF THE VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED <i>ZUZ</i> AND THE CARCASS HAD NO VALUE AT ALL, THE PLAINTIFF WILL TAKE POSSESSION OF THE [DEFENDANT'S] OX [THAT DID THE DAMAGE].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the full value of it corresponds in this case to the amount of half-damages. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Who is the author of our Mishnah? — It is R. Akiba, as it has been taught: The ox [that did the damage] has to be assessed by the Court of law;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And if its value is not less than the amount of the half-damages, the defendant will have to pay that amount in full, whereas where the value of the ox that did the damage is less than the amount of the half-damages, the defendant will have to pay no more than the actual value of the ox that did the damage. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> this is the view of R. Ishmael. R. Akiba, however, says: The [body of the] ox becomes transferred [to the plaintiff]. What is the point at issue? — R. Ishmael maintains that he [the plaintiff] is but a creditor and that he has only a claim of money against him [the defendant], whereas R. Akiba is of the opinion that they both [the plaintiff and defendant] become the owners in common of the ox<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where its value is more than the amount of the half-damages. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> [that did the damage]. They [thus also] differ as to the interpretation of the verse, Then they shall sell the live ox and divide the money of it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 35. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> R. Ishmael maintains that it is the Court on which this injunction is laid by Divine Law,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., to sell the live ox which is still the property of the defendant. ');"><sup>31</sup></span> whereas R. Akiba is of the opinion that it is the plaintiff and defendant on which it is laid.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the live ox became their property in common where its value had been more than the amount of the half-damages. ');"><sup>32</sup></span> What is the practical difference between R. Ishmael and R. Akiba? — There is a practical difference between them where the plaintiff consecrated the ox [that did the damage].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [According to R. Ishmael the consecration is of no legal effect, whereas R. Akiba would declare it valid.] ');"><sup>33</sup></span> Raba put the following question to R. Nahman: Should the defendant meanwhile dispose of the ox, what would be the law according to R. Ishmael? [Shall we say that] since R. Ishmael considers the plaintiff to be a creditor whose claim [against the defendant] is only regarding money, the sale is valid, or that